Friday, August 31, 2012
bell ringer 8/31/12
I think the government should not have block Texas's law to make voters show I.D. because it would have stopped under aged kids from voting. I think if Texas wanted to I.D. voters they should be allowed to.
Thursday, August 30, 2012
bell ringer 8/30/12
I think Hurricane Isaac is bad but it did not have as much destructive power as Hurricane Katrina.
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
Centinel #1 ande Brutus #1
Centinel #1
Background: A. Who is the author? Samuel Bryan
B. When was the essay written? Between 1787 and 1789
C. What had happened already when this essay was written? The constitution was written
Task 1: This differs from the Federalist Papers because it basically says the constitution isn't any good.
bell ringer 8/29/12
I think if you fake your own death to get a ton of money then you should get arrested but if you are faking your death because someone is looking for you because you saw something you shouldn't have seen or heard something you shouldn't have heard then I don't think you should get arrested for it. In Raymond Roth's case I can't say if it is a crime or not because I don't know if it was for the money or if he was trying to hide from people/person looking for him.
Tuesday, August 28, 2012
federalist papers #51
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal.
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.
Fed. papers #10
1.) James Madison
2.) 1787
3.) Federalists
4.) A small, organized, dissenting group within a larger one, esp. in politics.
5.) Eating in a school cafeteria.
6.) We would all be the same.
7.) Republic means government by elected representatives
Democracy means government in which the power is vested in all the people.
8.)
2.) 1787
3.) Federalists
4.) A small, organized, dissenting group within a larger one, esp. in politics.
5.) Eating in a school cafeteria.
6.) We would all be the same.
7.) Republic means government by elected representatives
Democracy means government in which the power is vested in all the people.
8.)
My Debate With Patrick Henry
Differences: 1. I am a federalist and Henry is an anti-fed.
2. I am for the constitution while Henry was against it.
3. I favored a strong central government and Patrick was opposed of having a strong central government.
4. Patrick was against the Connecticut Compromise yet I am all for it.
5.I helped write the federalist papers Henry did not
2. I am for the constitution while Henry was against it.
3. I favored a strong central government and Patrick was opposed of having a strong central government.
4. Patrick was against the Connecticut Compromise yet I am all for it.
5.I helped write the federalist papers Henry did not
bell ringer 8/28/12
I think he should be able to prayer in his cell but I don't think he should be able to do it in public.
Monday, August 27, 2012
James Madison - Federalist
Who are you? How old are you in 1787? I James Madison am 36 years old.
Are you federalist or anti-federalist? I am federalist.
What is your personal history up to 1787? I was born on March 16,1751 in Port Conway, Virginia. My father, Colonel James Madison Sr., born March 27, 1723 died February 27, 1801 was the owner of a tobacco plantation called Montpelier in Orange County, Virginia. I had eleven siblings five of which died in infancy or childhood.
What was your role in the Constitutional Convention? I promoted the Freedom of Religion.
What stated views would explain your actions during the Constitutional Convention? "All men having power should be mistrusted"
What is your stance during the ratifying conventions? Who supported your viewpoint? I am for it and George Washington supported me.
Are you federalist or anti-federalist? I am federalist.
What was your role in the Constitutional Convention? I promoted the Freedom of Religion.
What stated views would explain your actions during the Constitutional Convention? "All men having power should be mistrusted"
What is your stance during the ratifying conventions? Who supported your viewpoint? I am for it and George Washington supported me.
bell ringer 8/27/12
In my opinion this is religious discrimination. If Burger King told Ashanti that she could wear the long skirt and it wouldn't be a problem she should not have been asked to leave. Also her attorney said it would not have hindered her from doing her job so yes I think this is religious discrimination.
Friday, August 24, 2012
8/24/12 Notes
Federalists were those who supported the Constitution. James Madison (father of the Constitution).
Federalist papers was a collection of essays written to support the constitution.
Delaware- the 1st state
New Hampshire- the 9th state
Rhode Island- 13th state
Federalists- George Washington, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, John Baker Holroyd.
Anti Federalists-
Federalist papers was a collection of essays written to support the constitution.
Delaware- the 1st state
New Hampshire- the 9th state
Rhode Island- 13th state
Federalists- George Washington, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, John Baker Holroyd.
Anti Federalists-
bell ringer 8/24/12
Drama is a big problem in our society these days. I cannot stand drama. There are plenty of other ways of communication nowadays but instead people revert to arguing. It is completely stupid.
Thursday, August 23, 2012
civics assignment for August 23, 2012
1. Define the Constitution…..in your own words in a PARAGRAPH (3-5 sentences)
The Constitution of the United States is basically a list of laws and things you shouldn't do. It also give us our freedom. The are 3 parts to the constitution the preamble, the articles , and the amendments.
2. How would your life be without the constitution ? Lawless
3. Define the following words:
Faction- group or clique within a larger group, party, government, or organization
Federalism- the federal principle of government
Federalist- A member or supporter of the ferderalist party
Antifederalist-A member or supporter of the antifederal party
Antifederalist-A member or supporter of the antifederal party
Compromise- A settlement of differences by mutual concessions; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims, principles, etc., by reciprocal modification of demands.
The Great Compromise- Established a bicameral, or two-chambered, Congress made up of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Checks and Balances- government competition and mutual restraint among the various branches of government
Democratic Republic- a form of government embodying democratic principles and where a monarch is not the head of state
Delegated Powers of the Federal Government- Delegated powers are constitutional powers assigned to one government agency, but delegated to another agency with express permission.
Reserved Powers of the State Governments-
Seperation of Powers- separation of powers amongst different branches of government
Civil Liberties- the freedom of a citizen to exercise customary rights
citizenship test
I thought I would have gotten a better score than I did but it just goes to show that no matter how much of a American citizen you think you are you still don't know everything about America. My score was 4 out of 10 but like I said I thought it would have been better but I don't know everything about America.
bell ringer 8/23/12
I think it is kind of stupid that the people of Wisconsin are going to slam Ryan for living in Wisconsin and waving a Steelers towel around. It doesn't mean he is a Steelers fan and even if he is who cares it is just a game. People have a right to like a different team regardless of where you live. If he wants to be a Steelers fan I say more power to him. And to all the people who slammed him SHAME ON YOU!
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
bell ringer 8/22/12
The race to become president between Obama and Romney is very close. As of late Romney leads 47% to Obama's 46%. A couple months ago Romney had a 3% lead over Obama. In my opinion Obama will be re-elected on Nov. 6th and be president for another 4 years.
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
My name is Ryan House. I am a senior at Philip Barbour High School. I moved to West Virginia my 10th grade year and have been here ever since. I enjoy hanging out with friends and doing things outdoors. One of my favorite things to do outdoors is fishing. It is the most relaxing thing to do in my opinion. Fishing, to me, is a time to think. It is my favorite thing to do.
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